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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
All states have laws authorizing them to seize private 
property through escheat, “a procedure with ancient origins 
whereby a sovereign may acquire title to abandoned property 
if after a number of years no rightful owner appears.” Texas v. 
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 675 (1965). But in recent years, 
state escheat laws have come under assault for being 
exploited to raise revenue rather than reunite abandoned 
property with its owners. Delaware’s Escheats, or Unclaimed 
Property, Law is no exception; as unclaimed property has 
become Delaware’s third-largest source of revenue, 
companies have brought a wave of lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of Delaware’s escheat regime. 
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In this case, Plains All American Pipeline (“Plains”) 
seeks to attack the constitutionality of several provisions of 
the Delaware Escheats Law, as well as Delaware’s demand 
that it submit to an abandoned property audit. But because 
Plains brought suit before Delaware assessed liability based 
on its audit or sought a subpoena to make its audit-related 
document requests enforceable, the District Court dismissed 
the suit, finding that Plains’s claims were unripe except for an 
equal protection claim that it dismissed for failure to state a 
claim. Although we disagree with the District Court that 
Plains’s as-applied, procedural due process claim is unripe 
and will therefore reverse and remand in part, we will affirm 
the District Court’s dismissal in all other respects. 
I 
A 
Rooted in a practice that dates back to feudal times, 
Delaware’s Escheats Law is the mechanism by which 
Delaware takes custody of abandoned property in the State. 
As amended,1 the law provides that a holder of “property 
presumed abandoned” must file a yearly report with the State 
Escheator in which it provides information about the property 
                                              
1 Delaware amended its Escheats Law while this case 
was being briefed. Effective February 2, 2017, the 
amendments adopt some meaningful changes, like limiting 
the look-back period of audits and expressly granting 
Delaware subpoena power to enforce audits. For ease of 
reference, we will cite to the new version of the statute, given 
that the basic framework of the law remains unchanged. In so 
doing, we express no opinion on whether the amendments 
would apply retroactively to the Plains audit as they do not 
affect our analysis.  
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and its possible owner. Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 1142, 1143. 
When filing the yearly report, the holder must “pay or deliver 
. . . the property described in the report” to the State 
Escheator, id. § 1152, who then takes custody of the property 
and may sell it. 
To ensure compliance with the law, the statute permits 
the Escheator to “[e]xamine the records of a person or the 
records in the possession of an agent, representative, 
subsidiary, or affiliate of the person under examination in 
order to determine whether the person complied with this 
chapter.” Id. § 1171(1). And the “State Escheator may 
contract” with private third-parties to perform this audit on 
his or her behalf. Id. § 1178(a). If the person subject to 
examination “does not retain the records required,” the “State 
Escheator may determine the amount of property due using a 
reasonable method of estimation.” Id. § 1176(a). And if the 
State Escheator completes its examination and “determines 
that a holder has underreported unclaimed property due and 
owing,” the State Escheator “shall mail a statement of 
findings and request for payment to the holder that filed.” Id. 
§ 1179(a). When liability is assessed, the State may charge 
interest and penalties. Id. § 1183. But the holder of the 
abandoned property may seek judicial review of the 
Escheator’s decision in the Court of Chancery. Id. § 1179(b).  
B 
On October 22, 2014, Delaware’s Audit Manager, 
Michelle Whitaker, sent Plains a notice that the State intended 
to audit its records from 1986 through present to evaluate its 
compliance with Delaware’s Escheats Law. In that notice, 
Whitaker informed Plains that Kelmar Associates, a private 
auditing firm that conducts a large percentage of Delaware’s 
unclaimed property audits, would conduct the audit; that she 
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was “the final arbiter of any disputes that may arise during the 
course of the examination”; and that the audit would be 
expanded back to 1981 if not completed by June 30, 2015. 
J.A. 200. 
After Kelmar sent Plains its initial document requests, 
Plains sent a letter raising several constitutional objections to 
the audit and informing Whitaker that it would not respond to 
Kelmar. Dismissing Plains’s concerns as unfounded, 
Whitaker responded that multistate audits were common and 
Delaware’s actions were legal.  She directed Plains to 
“produce the records requested” by Kelmar and noted that 
“the State will consider the level of [Plains’s] cooperation 
when determining whether penalties should be assessed, or 
whether any other statutorily available actions should be 
taken, in connection with any past due unclaimed property 
that is identified as a result of the examination.” J.A. 325.  
Plains did not respond to Whitaker. Instead, it sued 
Kelmar, Whitaker, Delaware Secretary of Finance Thomas 
Cook, and Delaware State Escheator David Gregor in federal 
court for a declaration that the proposed audit violated the 
Constitution, an injunction preventing the defendants from 
pursuing the audit, and attorney’s fees. In its initial complaint, 
Plains alleged that the proposed audit and portions of 
Delaware’s Escheats Law violated the Fourth Amendment, as 
well as the Ex Post Facto, Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Takings Clauses of the Constitution. But Plains later amended 
its complaint to add one claim that Kelmar conspired with 
Delaware to violate its rights and two claims that Delaware’s 
Escheats Law was void for vagueness and preempted by 
federal law.  
In July 2015, the Defendants moved to dismiss the 
amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
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12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The District Court dismissed this case 
on August 16, 2016, finding that Plains’s claims were all 
unripe except for an equal protection claim that it dismissed 
for failure to state a claim. This timely appeal followed. 
II 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over both a 
district court’s dismissal for lack of ripeness, NE Hub 
Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 341 
(3d Cir. 2001), and its dismissal for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6), Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d 
Cir. 2008). Where, as here, the defendants move to dismiss a 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to allege subject 
matter jurisdiction, we treat the allegations in the complaint 
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff. NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 341. 
III 
On appeal, Plains argues that the District Court 
improperly dismissed six of its claims—four facial challenges 
and two as-applied challenges—as unripe.2 This assertion 
                                              
2 In addition to dismissing the six appealed claims, the 
District Court also dismissed Kelmar from the suit, and 
Plains’s Equal Protection, Ex Post Facto, and Takings Clause 
claims. It is well settled that an issue is waived and need not 
be addressed where, as here, the appellant “did not include 
any argument with respect to [it] or otherwise explain how 
the District Court erred.” Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y 
Gen. of United States, 677 F.3d 519, 545 (3d Cir. 2012). We 
will accordingly affirm those dismissals. 
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requires us to consider whether Plains has presented a 
justiciable case or controversy. 
A 
While it is “emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is,” Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), Article III of the 
Constitution limits the federal judiciary’s authority to exercise 
its “judicial Power” to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2. This case-or-controversy limitation, in 
turn, is crucial in “ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects 
the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a 
democratic society.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 
U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). And 
courts enforce it “through the several justiciability doctrines 
that cluster about Article III,” including “standing, ripeness, 
mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition 
on advisory opinions.” Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 
555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
As the District Court noted, this case involves 
ripeness, “a matter of degree whose threshold is notoriously 
hard to pinpoint.” NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 341. But because 
Plains is bringing a preenforcement action, the justiciability 
issue in this case can equally be described in terms of 
standing. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007) (“The justiciability problem that 
arises, when the party seeking declaratory relief is himself 
preventing the complained-of injury from occurring, can be 
described in terms of standing . . . or  . . . ripeness”); Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 825 F.3d 
149, 167 n.15 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[W]hether Plaintiffs have 
standing or their claims are ripe . . . both turn on whether the 
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threat of future harm . . . is sufficiently immediate to 
constitute a cognizable injury.”); Presbytery of N.J. of 
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 
(3d Cir. 1994) (“It is sometimes argued that standing is 
about who can sue while ripeness is about when they can sue, 
though it is of course true that if no injury has occurred, the 
plaintiff can be told either that she cannot sue, or that she 
cannot sue yet.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
At its core, ripeness works “to determine whether a 
party has brought an action prematurely . . . and counsels 
abstention until such a time as a dispute is sufficiently 
concrete to satisfy the constitutional and prudential 
requirements of the doctrine.” Peachalum v. City of York, 333 
F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003). Various concerns underpin it, 
including whether the parties are in a “sufficiently adversarial 
posture,” whether the facts of the case are “sufficiently 
developed,” and whether a party is “genuinely aggrieved.” Id. 
at 433-34. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 
(1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 
430 U.S. 99 (1977), the Supreme Court laid out two principal 
considerations for gauging ripeness including (1) “the fitness 
of the issues for judicial decision” and (2) “the hardship to the 
parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 149. And in 
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (“SBA List”), 134 S. Ct. 
2334 (2014), the Court illustrated that when evaluating 
ripeness as a matter of standing in preenforcement challenges, 
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we ask whether the plaintiff has “alleged a sufficiently 
imminent injury for the purposes of Article III.” Id. at 2338.3 
“In declaratory judgment cases, we apply a somewhat 
refined test” for ripeness, Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Blakely, 376 
F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), that was first articulated in our decision in Step-
Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643 
(3d Cir. 1990). Under the Step-Saver test, we look to “(1) the 
adversity of the parties’ interests, (2) the conclusiveness of 
the judgment, and (3) the utility of the judgment.” Khodara, 
376 F.3d at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). But 
before applying it, two points warrant clarification.  
First, although our Step-Saver test differs in form from 
the ripeness test articulated in Abbott Labs, or the standing 
test articulated in SBA List, it is merely a different framework 
for conducting the same justiciability inquiry. Since Step-
Saver “simply alters the headings under which various factors 
are grouped,” Phila. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 
319, 323 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998), we consider related claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief under the same Step-Saver 
test in a case like this one. See, e.g., NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 339-
49. And when we apply Step-Staver, Abbott Labs’s 
“hardship” and “fitness” factors still guide our analysis, as 
does the standing test set forth in SBA List.  
                                              
3 In SBA List, the Supreme Court also suggested that 
the prudential components of ripeness may no longer be a 
valid basis to find a case nonjusticiable. 134 S. Ct. at 2347. 
To the extent we discuss prudential ripeness factors, our 
holding does not rest on them; rather, our holding rests on the 
constitutional requirements of Article III. 
12 
 
Second, while the three Step-Saver factors “guide our 
disposition,” Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 647, they “are not 
exhaustive of the principles courts have considered in 
evaluating ripeness.” Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 
961 F.2d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 1992). As we have noted, “where 
the constitutionality of a state provision is at issue, the 
Supreme Court has taken into account the degree to which 
postponing federal judicial review would have the advantage 
of permitting state courts further opportunity to construe the 
challenged provisions.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation 
marks omitted). And courts have also invoked the Ashwander 
principle, see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 
346–47, (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), to avoid “ruling on 
federal constitutional matters in advance of the necessity of 
deciding them.” Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 413; see also Renne 
v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991) (“It is not the usual 
judicial practice . . . to proceed to an overbreadth issue . . . 
before it is determined that the statute would be valid as 
applied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). With these 
principles in mind, we will analyze the justiciability of 
Plains’s claims. 
B 
Four of the claims that are the subject of Plains’s 
appeal are facial challenges—three allege that the estimation 
provisions of the Delaware Escheats Law are preempted, void 
for vagueness, and violate substantive due process, while the 
fourth alleges that the Delaware Escheats Law violates the 
Fourth Amendment by not affording precompliance judicial 
review of an auditor’s document demands. The two as-
applied claims at issue on appeal include a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the scope of Kelmar’s document 
requests and a procedural due process challenge to Kelmar’s 
appointment to conduct the audit. For the reasons set forth 
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below, we agree with the District Court that Plains’s four 
facial challenges and its as-applied Fourth Amendment claim 
are unripe.4 But we disagree with its conclusion that Plains’s 
procedural due process claim is not justiciable. In so holding, 
we will consider Plains’s facial and as-applied challenges 
separately. 
Facial Challenges to the Estimation Statute 
1. Adversity of Interest 
“Parties’ interests are adverse where harm will result if 
the declaratory judgment is not entered.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir. 1995). As we have 
explained, when “the plaintiff’s action is based on a 
contingency, it is unlikely that the parties’ interests will be 
sufficiently adverse to give rise to a case or controversy 
within the meaning of Article III.” Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 
412-13. But “where threatened action by government is 
concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to 
liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the 
threat.” MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128-29. Accordingly, “the 
party seeking review need not have suffered a completed 
harm to establish adversity”—it suffices that there is a 
“substantial threat of real harm and that the threat . . . remain 
real and immediate throughout the course of the litigation.” 
Florio, 40 F.3d at 1463 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
                                              
4 In reaching these conclusions, we note that our 
decision today does not speak to the decision in Marathon 
Petroleum Corp. v. Cook, 208 F. Supp. 3d 576 (D. Del. 
2016), which has been appealed and is pending before 
another panel of this Court. There, a different district judge 
found a preemption and as-applied Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the Delaware Escheats Law ripe.  
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Relying principally on Abbott Labs and our decision in 
NE Hub, Plains has taken the position that its interests are 
adverse to Delaware’s because it is being forced to choose 
between complying with a burdensome law and risking 
serious penalties. While we agree that a challenge to 
government action is typically ripe when a party is faced with 
that dilemma, we simply cannot find that Plains confronts 
such a situation here. 
Since estimation merely requires Plains to sit back and 
wait while Delaware calculates its liability, estimation is not a 
burdensome process “where the impact of the administrative 
action could be said to be felt immediately by those subject to 
it in conducting their day-to-day affairs.” Toilet Goods Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967). And while one 
possible result of the estimation process—an arbitrary 
penalty—could harm Plains, that harm would only result after 
Delaware (1) concluded that Plains’s records were 
inadequate, (2) used estimation, (3) found past-due 
abandoned property, and (4) erroneously calculated what was 
owed to the State. As such, the only alleged harm Plains 
could suffer from estimation is based on contingencies and its 
substantive due process, void-for-vagueness, and preemption 
claims lack both sufficient adversity for ripeness and a 
cognizable Article III injury. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that Article III 
standing requires a party to “have suffered an injury” that is 
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Texas v. United States, 
523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for 
adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may 
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not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).5  
Unlike estimation, the average Kelmar audit can be 
quite burdensome, costing over one million dollars and 
spanning three to eight years. Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 52, J.A. 51. 
And Plains maintains that those costs along with Delaware’s 
warning that it would “consider the level of Plains’s 
cooperation when determining whether penalties should be 
assessed,” J.A. 325, have supplied adversity for its Fourth 
Amendment claims. Though we think the adversity inquiry is 
closer for Plains’s challenge to the audit provisions of the 
statute than it is for its challenges to the estimation provisions 
of the statute, we still find adversity lacking for two reasons. 
First, while “the requirement to go through a 
burdensome process can constitute hardship for the purposes 
of ripeness,” NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 345, our precedent 
confirms that in all but those cases where the administrative 
process is at issue and imposes burdens that directly affect an 
entity’s day-to-day business, the costs of administrative 
investigations are usually not sufficient, however substantial, 
to justify review in a case that would otherwise be unripe. 
Compare Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 
F.3d 57, 70 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding challenge to 
administrative process unripe where “the audit at issue” had 
“no direct effect on the plaintiffs’ primary conduct” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), with NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 342-46 
                                              
5 Plains responds that the State’s refusal to disavow 
that it will engage in unlawful conduct creates a credible 
threat of harm. See Plains Br. 31-33. But that is not sufficient 
to make these claims justiciable. The “threatened 
enforcement” must still be “sufficiently imminent.” SBA List, 
134 S. Ct. at 2342.  
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(finding challenge to preempted administrative process ripe 
where subjecting plaintiff to it would affect whether and how 
plaintiff proceeded with significant construction project); see 
also Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 
735 (1998) (“[T]he Court has not considered . . . litigation 
cost saving sufficient by itself to justify review in a case that 
would otherwise be unripe.”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (noting 
the “substantial” burden on the company “of responding to . . 
. charges” is “different in kind and legal effect.”). Contrary to 
Plains’s arguments on appeal, the administrative process 
being challenged here does not present the circumstances 
required for administrative-process expenses to supply 
adversity. Unlike in NE Hub, the process at issue here is an 
“audit . . . directed only at past conduct,” so “the only effects 
[Plains] will encounter are related to [its] participation in the 
investigatory process and actions that might be taken as a 
result.” Corrigan, 347 F.3d at 70. Like in Corrigan, Plains 
does not argue that Delaware lacks the authority to conduct 
its audit; rather, Plains’s preemption claim is directed at the 
statute’s estimation provisions. And finally, in this case 
Kelmar’s audit has not yet begun so it is wholly speculative 
whether the audit will be particularly burdensome and costly 
and result in an enforcement action. The extent of the burden 
is thus “conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Second, we do not believe Delaware’s request to 
comply with the audit presents the Abbott Labs dilemma that 
exists when “a regulation requires an immediate and 
significant change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs 
with serious penalties attached to non-compliance.” 387 U.S. 
at 153. Since this audit is an investigation confined to past 
conduct, it does not have the “direct effect” on “day-to-day 
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business,” id. at 152, that existed in Abbott Labs when 
regulations imposed new obligations requiring the company 
to change labels, destroy stocks, and invest in new supplies. 
And we are not persuaded that Whitaker’s letter attaches 
serious penalties to Plains’s decision not to comply with the 
audit. Even if we found that she threatened a penalty, since 
the penalty cannot be imposed without a finding of unclaimed 
property liability, Plains is not yet in a place where it must 
choose between submitting to the audit or facing penalties—it 
still has a third option where it could refuse to submit to the 
audit without incurring a penalty. 
2. Conclusiveness 
The next prong of Step-Saver considers whether the 
contest is based on “a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive 
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the 
law would be upon a hypothetical set of facts.” Florio, 40 
F.3d at 1463 (internal quotation marks omitted). In analyzing 
this factor, two concerns are paramount. First, we consider 
whether “the legal status of the parties” will “be changed or 
clarified.” Travelers, 72 F.3d at 1155. Second, we ask 
“whether further factual development . . . would facilitate 
decision” or “the question presented is predominantly legal.” 
NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 344.  
On this prong, Plains argues that its facial challenges 
to the Escheats Law would result in a conclusive judgment 
because it presents predominately legal claims that require no 
factual development. We disagree. To prevail on its facial 
challenges, Plains must demonstrate that “no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [Escheat Law] would be 
valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), 
and while “predominantly legal questions are generally 
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amenable to a conclusive determination in a preenforcement 
context,” Florio, 40 F.3d at 1468 (emphasis added), that does 
not mean they always are. As the Supreme Court’s decision in 
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015), affirms, 
“when there is substantial ambiguity as to what conduct a 
statute authorizes,” it may be “impossible to tell whether and 
to what extent it deviates from the requirements of the 
[Constitution].” Id. at 2450 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). And in such circumstances, evaluating the 
constitutional validity of the statute “is pre-eminently the sort 
of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual 
context of the case.” Id. at 2449 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968)). 
As the Defendants note, Plains’s constitutional 
challenges to the Escheats Law, like the facial challenges in 
Sibron, involve precisely the sort of case where “further 
factual development would significantly advance our ability 
to deal with the legal issues presented.” Corrigan, 347 F.3d at 
68 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Escheats Law 
contains no definition of what estimation entails, nor does it 
explain whether preenforcement review exists or what it 
looks like. Thus the statute is “susceptible to a wide variety of 
interpretations,” Sibron, 392 U.S. at 60, and because we 
cannot yet state with certainty what conduct is authorized—
let alone that only unconstitutional conduct is allowed—
ruling on Plains’s facial claims now would not result in 
conclusive judgment.6  
                                              
6 Indeed, Plains concedes in its reply brief that until we 
know whether the amendments apply to its audit and what the 
enforcement proceedings will look like, we lack sufficient 
information to determine whether enforcement proceedings 
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Reply Br. 26. And this 
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3. Practical Utility 
 Finally, the third prong of the Step-Saver test requires 
us to examine the utility of judgment. “Practical utility goes 
to whether the parties’ plans of actions are likely to be 
affected by a declaratory judgment . . . and considers the 
hardship to the parties of withholding judgment.” NE Hub, 
239 F.3d at 344-45 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 (“One of the primary 
purposes behind the Declaratory Judgment Act was to enable 
plaintiffs to preserve the status quo before . . . damage was 
done . . . .”). It also examines whether entry of judgment 
“would be useful to the parties and others who could be 
affected.” Florio, 40 F.3d at 1470.  
 While judgment in this case may be of interest to the 
other companies challenging this law, practical utility is not 
satisfied. Since estimation involves no action by Plains, and 
no unclaimed property fine is impending, Plains “would take 
the same steps whether or not it was granted a declaratory 
judgment.” Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv. v. Int’l Union of 
                                                                                                     
same issue plagues Plains’s facial challenges to the estimation 
statute. Because in “other contexts and under other statutes, 
courts have routinely permitted the use of statistical 
sampling” to determine amounts owed to the government, 
Chaves Cty. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 
914, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and because the Escheat Law does 
not provide a specific estimation method for us to evaluate, 
we would need to see which estimation processes are 
employed before we could determine that estimation violates 
substantive due process, is impermissibly vague in all its 
applications, or is inconsistent with federal common law and 
preempted.  
 
20 
 
Operating Eng’rs, 580 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2009). And to 
the extent a declaratory judgment might spare Plains from a 
costly audit, a judgment before Delaware takes any further 
action would render the utility of a decision remote for the 
same reason a judgment would not be conclusive. Because 
the constitutionality of the Escheats Law appears to turn 
largely on how it is enforced, any decision now would not 
“clarify legal relationships so that plaintiffs (and possibly 
defendants) could make responsible decisions about the 
future.” NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 345 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Rather, in speculating how the law would be 
enforced, we would leave parties to guess whether Delaware 
could take the same actions in a different matter. 
As-Applied Claims 
1. Fourth Amendment Claim 
Unlike Plains’s facial claims, Plains’s as-applied 
Fourth Amendment claim satisfies the last two prongs of 
Step-Saver. A judgment on these claims would be conclusive. 
It would affect “the legal status of the parties” by determining 
whether Delaware can request the documents they demanded. 
Travelers, 72 F.3d at 1155. And further factual development 
is unnecessary—because Kelmar has already issued its 
document requests, we have “a set of facts from which” we 
can “declare the parties’ rights based on those facts.” Id. 
Practical utility is satisfied for similar reasons. Holding that 
the document requests are overbroad would affect what Plains 
turns over, so its “actions are likely to be affected by a 
declaratory judgment.” Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9. And 
“entry of a declaratory judgment . . . in the instant case would 
be useful to the parties and others who could be affected,” by 
providing some guidance on what documents may be 
requested during an audit. Florio, 40 F.3d at 1469. 
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Nonetheless, the fact that this claim satisfies these two 
prongs does not make it ripe—our precedent makes clear that 
“plaintiffs raising predominantly legal claims must still meet 
the minimum requirements for Article III jurisdiction,” 
Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 421, and, for the same reasons 
Plains’s facial Fourth Amendment claim lacks adversity, its 
as-applied Fourth Amendment claim does so as well. Again, 
in all but those cases where the administrative process is at 
issue and affects a plaintiff’s primary conduct, the burden of 
an administrative investigation cannot usually itself confer 
Article III jurisdiction. And this is not an Abbott Labs 
situation. Whether put in terms of ripeness or standing, 
because the audit is not enforceable, and because its 
occurrence is still based on contingencies, Plains has not 
alleged a “sufficiently imminent injury” that would give rise 
to a justiciable case under Article III of the Constitution. SBA 
List, 134 S. Ct. at 2338. 
2.  Procedural Due Process Claim 
Finally, we hold that the District Court improperly 
concluded that Plains’s as-applied procedural due process 
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claim is not justiciable.7 To establish a due process violation, 
all Plains must show is that it was required to submit a dispute 
to a self-interested party. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247, 266 (1978) (“Because the right to procedural due process 
is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the 
merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions . . . we believe 
that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable 
. . . without proof of actual injury.”); United Church of Med. 
Ctr. v. Med. Ctr. Comm’n, 689 F.2d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(“Submission to a fatally biased decisionmaking process is in 
itself a constitutional injury”). And because Kelmar has been 
vested with responsibility for conducting the Plains audit and 
has issued document demands, this claim satisfies all three 
Step-Saver prongs. 
As with the as-applied Fourth Amendment claim, the 
conclusiveness and utility prongs of Step-Saver are satisfied. 
No further factual development is needed to address the 
merits of this claim, and a ruling on the merits would be 
                                              
7 On appeal, Cook, Gregor, and Whitaker argue that 
this claim was not raised below. We disagree. Plains’s 
amended complaint specifically challenges Delaware’s 
delegation of authority to Kelmar. Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 116, J.A. 
68 (“Kelmar has a large financial stake in the outcome of the 
audit and is not a neutral party.”). And Plains reiterated its 
challenge to Kelmar’s appointment in its opposition to the 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss. S.A. 22 (“Plains has asserted 
claims for violations of procedural and substantive due 
process based on . . . Defendants’ improper delegation of 
authority to Kelmar, allowing Kelmar to act in a quasi-
judicial capacity . . . .”). Perhaps Plains could have been 
clearer. But its challenge to Kelmar’s appointment was 
adequately raised below. 
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“useful to the parties and others who could be affected” given 
Delaware’s widespread use of private auditors. Florio, 40 
F.3d at 1470. In addition, given the nature of a biased 
adjudicator claim, adversity exists. Because the conduct being 
challenged by Plains is the appointment of Kelmar to conduct 
this audit, the harm alleged for this claim is not based on a 
contingency; it is based on conduct that has already occurred. 
Perhaps this arrangement is constitutional, as Delaware 
asserts, but that is a merits question. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (“Our threshold inquiry into 
standing ‘in no way depends on the merits of the 
[petitioner’s] contention that particular conduct is illegal.’” 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975))). Since 
all three Step-Saver elements are present, Plains’s procedural 
due process claim is ripe and the District Court erred in 
dismissing it. Travelers, 72 F.3d at 1154.  
IV 
Though Cook, Gregor, and Whitaker request that we 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Plains’s procedural 
due process claim on the ground that Plains has failed to state 
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), we think it improper to do so. 
While we “may affirm a district court for any reason 
supported by the record,” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 
187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011), “[g]enerally, in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, we decline to consider an issue 
not passed upon below.” Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 28 
(3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Singelton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the 
general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not  
consider an issue not passed upon below.”). Here, the 
Delaware Defendants do not identify—nor can we discern—
any exceptional circumstances. Thus we will remand this 
claim for the District Court to address it in the first instance.  
24 
 
V 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal of Plain’s procedural due process 
claim, and remand it for the District Court’s consideration in 
the first instance. We will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal in all other respects. 
